










RICHARD SBONELO MKHIZE 




THIS RESEARCH PROJECT IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REGULATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 












I, Richard Sbonelo Mkhize, hereby declare that:  
1. This dissertation is my own work and I have not copied the work of another student or 
author; 
2. This dissertation is the result of my own unaided research and has not been previously 
submitted in part or in full for any other degree or to any other University; 
3. The written work is entirely my own except where other sources are acknowledged; 
4. Collaboration in the writing of this dissertation or the copying of another student‟s 
work constitutes cheating for which I may be excluded from the University;  
5. This dissertation has not been submitted in this or similar form in another module at 
this or any other University; and 
6. This project is an original piece of work which is made available for photocopying 















The author is grateful to the supervisor, Professor Shannon Hoctor and Doctor Caroline 
Goodier who both dedicated their time to provide much appreciated guidance throughout this 
project and ensured that this project is successful.  
 
Thanks also to Doctor Rose Kuhn who contributed by providing the required reading material 
whenever she was requested to.       
 
I would also like to thank my family, especially, my wife, Thandekile Maureen Mkhize for 
providing emotional support and, of course, my children, namely, Nomvelo, Mdumiseni and 



































The crime of housebreaking with intent to commit a crime was unknown in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law. This crime was treated as an aggravated form of theft. It emanates from 
the English law crimes of burglary and housebreaking. Its development was fraught with 
technicalities due to the fragmentary nature of its elements. However, the South African law 
followed its own developmental path even though the English law authorities contributed to 
its development by way of authorities. There have been calls for this crime to be abolished or 
statutorily regulated due to the difficulties or problems caused by some of its elements and 
due to a lack of overarching rationale for it.          
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the „breaking‟ and „premises‟ requirements of 
the common-law crime of housebreaking with intent to commit a crime from South African 
law perspective. These two elements have been criticised for causing most difficulties or 
problems for this crime. The various journal articles, textbooks, relevant case law and 
statutory provisions on this topic are considered for this dissertation. After due consideration 
of all the relevant material, it becomes conspicuous that the South African law cannot afford 
not to have this crime as part of our law; thus the crime cannot be abolished. The dissertation 
concludes that the crime of housebreaking should remain a common-law crime as opposed to 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The historical background  
  
The historical background of the crime of housebreaking pertains to the origin of this crime. 
The prominent sources of South African law insofar as the common law is concerned are 
Roman law and Roman-Dutch law. The position in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law insofar 
as the crime of housebreaking is concerned is discussed in the next paragraph, then English 
law in the following paragraph. 
 




 was unknown in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.
2
 Instead, the crime 
of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft was treated as an aggravated form of theft.
3
 
There had to be actual theft in the crime of housebreaking with intent to steal for the 
housebreaking to form the aggravating circumstance.
4
 The housebreaking without theft was 
treated as attempted theft in Roman-Dutch law.
5
 When housebreaking was committed with 
intent to commit any other offence other than theft, the housebreaking could be punished as 
an iniuria.
6




1.1.2 English Law 
Intrusions into another person‟s home were punishable as a specific and separate offence of 
burglary.
8
 The word burglary is derived from “burgum” which means the house and “latro” 
which means theft.
9
 This crime was developed as a means of protecting the security, sanctity 
                                                          
1 For the sake of brevity, the crime of housebreaking will be used throughout this dissertation instead of its full name: 
housebreaking with intent to commit a crime. 
2 J M Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4ed (2013) 746; C R Snyman „Reforming the law relating to housebreaking‟ (1993) 
6 SACJ 38, 39; M Watney „Unnecessary confusion in respect of housebreaking‟ (2014) 3 TSAR 606, 609. 
3 J R L Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol II: Common Law Crimes 3ed (1996) 794; Burchell (note 2 
above) 746; Watney (note 2 above) 609. 
4 Snyman (note 2 above) 39. 
5 Milton (note 3 above) 794; Snyman (note 2 above) 39. 
6 Milton (note 3 above) 794; Snyman (note 2 above) 39; Watney (note 2 above) 609. 
7 Snyman (note 2 above) 39. 
8 Milton (note 3 above) 794; Watney (note 2 above) 609. 
9 Milton (note 3 above) 794. 
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and privacy of the home.
10
 The purpose of this crime was to prevent the contemplated attacks 
upon and the destruction of the defences of “hamesocn” and “hus-brice”.
11
 When the attacks 
occurred at night they were regarded as aggravating circumstances of the crime.
12
 As time 
went on, the crime began to change and became complete only when the attack had taken 
place at night.
13
 By the seventeenth century the crime of burglary had been restricted to only 
cases of breaking and entering into the house or mansion of another with intent to commit 
any felonious crime at night.
14
 This necessarily meant that all the intrusions which occurred 
during the day were excluded from the burglary definition.  
 
A burglar was then described as a person who would, in the night time, break and enter into 
another person‟s house or mansion, with intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit 
some other felony within the same house or mansion, irrespective of whether the felonious 
intent was executed or not.
15
 Since burglary was a felony it was punishable by death.
16
 Hus-
brice, or housebreaking, became a burglary if it took place during the day; however, it was a 





The common-law crime of burglary was developed and comprised six elements which were 
as follows: (a) breaking, (b) entering, (c) the house/mansion/dwelling, (d) of another, (e) in 
the night time and (f) with intent to commit a felony inside.
18
 As a result of the severity of the 
penalty for the burglary
19
 following a conviction, the judges began to adopt a strict 
construction of these burglary elements.
20
 Then the crime came to be fraught with 
meaningless distinctions and aimless definitions.
21
 The crime of burglary only ceased to be a 
capital offence in 1837 when it became punishable by life imprisonment.
22
 Housebreaking 
                                                          
10 Ibid 792. 
11 Ibid 794, where „hamesocn‟ is described as an assault upon another person in his or her home and „hus-brice‟ is 
described as a forcible or furtive entry into the house another person.  
12 Ibid 794. 
13 Ibid 794. 
14 Ibid 794. 
15 Ibid 794. 
16 Ibid 794. 
17 Ibid 794. 
18 Ibid 794-95. 
19 It became a capital offence thus capital punishment was applicable.   
20 Milton (note 3 above) 795. 
21 Ibid 795. 
22 Ibid 795 
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was made a felony by statute through the Larceny Act of 1916.
23
 The English authorities 
emphasised that housebreaking was a crime against someone‟s habitation, for which the 
English laws had a special respect, for the reason that every person by law had special 




A new era began when Theft Act of 1968 (Theft Act) introduced a new offence of burglary. 
Most of the elements of the common-law crime of burglary were abandoned.
25
 Section 9 of 
the Theft Act provides that „a person is guilty of burglary if, with intent to commit a specific 
offence, he
26
 enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and steals or attempts to 
steal anything in the building or in the part of the building or inflicts or attempts to inflict on 
any person therein any grievous bodily harm‟.
27
 The specific offences, that are said may be 
committed inside the building or part of the building, are mentioned as follows: theft; 
infliction of grievous bodily harm on any person; raping of any woman; and doing of 
unlawful damage to the building or anything therein.
28
 The „building‟ is defined as an 
inhabited vehicle or vessel, whether or not the inhabitant is there.
29
 In terms of section 10 of 
the Theft Act, a person who is guilty of aggravated burglary is liable to more severe penalties 
if he commits any burglary and at the time of such commission had with him any firearm or 




The „breaking‟ element was replaced, with the hope that it would simplify the position that 
the offender is a trespasser when he enters the building.
31
 All that was required for the 
complete crime of burglary was mere entry into the building with intent to commit a crime. 
The English authors opine that the concept of entry as a trespasser has not proved to be an 
easy one.
32
 The lesson to be learnt from the English law are that the mere replacing of 
difficult concepts is no quick fix solution as the new concepts will again still require 
interpretation and development, giving rise to challenges of their own.
33
 This tells us that the 
                                                          
23 Ibid 795. 
24 Ibid 794. 
25 Ibid 795. 
26 Any reference to the man in this dissertation shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, be construed as a reference 
inclusive of a woman.   
27 Milton (note 3 above) 795. 
28 Ibid 795. 
29 Ibid 795. 
30 Ibid 795. 
31 Watney (note 2 above) 610. 
32 Ibid 610. 
33 Ibid 610. 
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replacement of the „breaking‟ element with mere „entry‟ never yielded any positive results in 
English law as there are still current difficulties experienced with the statutory offence of 
burglary.  
 
1.2 Development of the crime 
 
The perceived deficiencies of the housebreaking crime may be attributed to its historical 
development.
34
 This crime was developed on a piecemeal basis, the courts having a central 
role in shaping it by interpretation, and it gradually took a different form.
35
 The development 
of the crime was fraught with technicalities and propelled by the capital nature of the crime, 
which resulted in the courts trying to avoid convictions by creating fine distinctions with 
regard to the elements of this crime.
36
 The accretion of the occasional statutory provisions 
also had an effect of changing the crime from what it had originally been.
37
 Burglary crime 
was then exported to the English colonies where the technical nature of the crime enabled 
intruders to avoid liability if the entry into the premises had been lawful as their acts were not 
against the artificialities created by the judicial fiat.
38
 Although the English law offences of 
burglary and housebreaking together closely approximated the housebreaking crime in South 
African law and contributed immensely to its development by way of authorities, the South 
African law followed its own developmental path thereby avoiding some of the eccentricities 
of English law.
39
 This clearly tells us that the problems and difficulties of this crime go as far 
back as the ancient times, before it even became part of our law. The development of the 
crime was overshadowed by these difficulties as has been mentioned.   
 
1.3 Rationale for this study 
 
The crime of housebreaking has been a common-law crime ever since it became part of South 
African law.
40
 As mentioned above, this crime emanates from the English law crimes of 
                                                          
34 S V Hoctor „The historical antecedents of the housebreaking crime‟ (1999) 5 Fundamina 97, 98. 
35 Ibid 98. 
36 Ibid 98. 
37 Ibid 98, where the learned author has given an example of the statutory provision which included breaking out of the 
premises after a lawful entry within the definition of the crime.  
38 Ibid 98-99. 
39 Ibid 100. 





 and was unknown in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.
42
 There 
have been calls from some criminal law writers to have this crime: abolished without 
replacing it with any new one; treated as a qualified form of the offence committed inside the 
premises; created as a new offence of unlawful intrusion on certain types of premises; or, 
required to add to the unlawful entering of the premises an ulterior intention by the intruder, 
that is, an intention to commit some further crime inside.
43
 The calls have been forthcoming 
due to the difficulties experienced with some of its elements, namely, the „breaking‟, 




There are divergent points of view relating to the reformation of the crime of housebreaking. 
The controversy pertaining to the existence of the crime of housebreaking revolves around 
the „breaking‟ and „premises‟ requirements. There has been no hard and fast rule relating to 
what constitutes the „breaking‟ and what constitutes the „premises‟. Neither the South African 
courts nor criminal law writers could agree on the extent to which these two requirements 
may be applied. There is no piece of legislation relating to either the definition of these two 
requirements or the crime of housebreaking itself.       
 
The existence of the crime of housebreaking has been trenchantly criticized by South African 
and Anglo-American scholars who have called for its demise and its replacement with the 
statutory offence of trespass.
45
 The origin of the criticisms is said to be that the elements 
which comprise housebreaking crime are fragmentary and technical in nature and further that 
there is a lack of overarching rationale for the crime.
46
 The requirements that are subject to 
criticism are „breaking‟, „premises‟ or „structure‟ and the „additional intention‟.
47
 The most 
problematic element of these three requirements is that of „breaking‟, which pertains to the 
facilitation or causing of entry into the premises.
48
 It is not only criminal law writers who 
have been critical of this crime and called for the legislative intervention but also judicial 
                                                          
41 Hoctor (note 34 above) 100. 
42 Milton (note 3 (above) 794; Burchell (note 2 above) 746; Watney (note 2 above) 609. 
43 Snyman (note 2 above) 38. 
44 Snyman (note 2 above) 43-44. 
45 Hoctor (note 34 above) 98; Watney 611. 
46 Ibid 98. 
47 Snyman (note 2 above) 40. 







1.4 Statement of Purpose 
 
This dissertation will focus on the two elements of the crime of housebreaking, namely, the 
„breaking‟ and the „premises‟ requirements.
50
 The case law pertaining to these two 
requirements will be examined. The origin and the extent of the controversy around these two 
requirements will be considered. The research will consider the nature of the crime of 
housebreaking in general and the developments made by the courts as well as the invaluable 
contributions made by the criminal law writers. It will, furthermore, consider the 
impracticality of doing away with any of the requirements which presently constitute the 
crime of housebreaking from South African law perspective. At the end, it will be argued that 
the crime of housebreaking should neither be abolished nor legislated but should remain a 
common-law crime in South African law, however, the extension of the concept of „breaking‟ 
is to be employed and the adoption of the common-sense approach insofar as „premises‟ is 
concerned is to be preferred. Thus the purpose of this study is to examine the „breaking‟ and 
„premises‟ requirements of the common-law crime of housebreaking with intent to commit a 
crime from South African law perspective.  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
1.5.1 ‘Breaking’ requirement - questions 
 
How significant is the „breaking‟ requirement in the crime of housebreaking? What 
difficulties does it cause, if any? What could possibly be the effects of the elimination of this 
requirement from the definition of the crime? 
 
1.5.2 ‘Premises’ Requirement - questions 
 
                                                          
49 C R Snyman Criminal Law 6ed (2014) 543 cites the following three cases of S v Ngobeza 1992 1 SACR 610 (T), S v 
Abrahams 1998 2 SACR 655 (C) and S v Woodrow 1999 2 SACR 109 (C) in respect of which the presiding judicial officers 
were critical of this common-law crime. 
50 The reason for focusing on the „breaking‟ and „premises‟ requirements of the crime housebreaking is because they are the 
most difficult and problematic elements compared to the additional intention element of the crime.   
7 
 
What is the „premises‟ in the context of this crime? What has been the courts‟ approach over 
the years towards this element? How consistent have the courts been adopting the same 




Desktop research methodology has been employed for this dissertation. Various textbooks on 
criminal law pertaining to this topic have been used. The case law germane to the topic has 
been used to illustrate or demonstrate that the crime of housebreaking should remain a 
common law in South African law as opposed to the call to have it abolished and/or 
subsumed by trespass offence. The case which began the criticism of the nature of this crime 
is S v Ngobeza.
51
 Various scholarly articles have been reviewed for this dissertation including 
Hoctor‟s thesis.
52
 The articles have been used to support the viewpoint that this crime serves 
the interest of all South Africans and that the difficulties and problems relating to some of its 
elements may be overcome.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Dissertation Structure 
 
This chapter has introduced the dissertation. It has covered the historical background of the 
crime of housebreaking where different sources of our law have been discussed, namely, 
Roman and Roman-Dutch Law as well as English Law. Development of this crime, rationale 
for this study, statement of purpose and research questions as well as the methodology 
employed have all been discussed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter two deals with the current formulation of the crime of housebreaking in South 
African law. All the elements of the crime are briefly discussed apart from the „breaking‟ and 
„premises‟ requirements. The nature and purpose of this crime is covered. The proposed 
reformation of this crime is considered and analyzed.   
 
Chapter three deals with the element of „breaking‟ as one of the vital elements of the crime of 
                                                          
51 Ngobeza (note 49 above) 610. 




housebreaking. The current position in South African law relating to the courts‟ interpretation 
of this element is discussed. The origin of the controversy and the critical role played by this 
element in the crime of housebreaking are also covered.  
 
Chapter four deals with the element of „premises‟. There is an in-depth analysis of the 
literature on this element covering the origin and common-law jurisdictions in relation to this 
element. The current position in South African law is covered. De Wet/Snyman and Hoctor 
perspectives are examined.  
 
Chapter five provides a conclusion to the dissertation. The findings are summarized and their 
significance discussed. Recommendations are made with regard to the treatment of 






2. THE CRIME OF HOUSEBREAKING IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
2.1 Definition 
 
The crime of housebreaking consists in unlawfully and intentionally breaking into and 
entering the building or the structure with the intention of committing some crime in it.
53
 The 
element of intention is divided into two parts: firstly, the accused must have the intention of 
unlawfully breaking into and entering the house or the structure; and secondly, the accused 
must, at the time of housebreaking, have the intention of committing some other crime 
inside.
54
 It can be deduced from this definition that the crime of housebreaking comprises six 
elements, namely, (a) unlawful and (b) intentional, (c) breaking into and (d) enter (e) the 
premises (f) with intent to commit a crime within the premises.
55
 Criminal liability only 
follows once all six elements have been fulfilled. Each of these elements apart from two 
elements is briefly described in this chapter the two elements not considered here, namely, 
the „breaking‟ and the „premises‟ elements, will be discussed in details in chapters three and 
four respectively.  
 
2.2 The Nature and Purpose of the Crime  
 
The South African common-law crime of housebreaking reflects the development by the 
South African courts from the early English law, with some of its eccentricities removed.
56
 
The South African law has avoided many of the former technical English distinctions by 
unifying housebreaking into one crime in terms of the common law and is wider than the 
crimes of burglary and housebreaking in English law.
57
 The effect of this development is that 
                                                          
53 Snyman (note 49 above) 543; Milton (note 3 above) 792; Burchell (note 2 above) 744 defines it as a crime consisting in 
unlawfully breaking and entering premises with the intent to commit that crime. Milton cites the definition given by Gardiner 
and Lansdown in their 6th edition, 1717 which reads as follows “consists: (1) in the removal or displacement of some part of 
the structure of a house, or of premises in the nature of a house, with the object of gaining admission thereto and committing 
some crime therein, and (2) in the entry of the offender into the house or premises broken, or the insertion by him into the 
house or premises of any part of his body or any instrument with which he proposes to exercise control over anything within 
the house or premises”. The learned author is critical of this definition for the reasons that it gives the detailed discussion of 
the breaking, entering and premises elements in the definition instead of giving such a detailed discussion in the text; that 
the definition of these elements in the definition is superfluous; that this makes the definition unwieldy and that the definition 
omits the unlawfulness element.  
54 Snyman (note 49 above) 548. 
55 Burchell (note 2 above) 744; Snyman (note 49 above) 543. 
56 Milton (note 3 above) 795; Snyman (note 49 above) 543. 
57 Ibid 795. 
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housebreaking is no longer regarded as an aggravated form of theft, that housebreaking with 
intent to commit a crime is a substantive crime on its own and that, when the crime is 
committed inside the premises, such crime is a completely separate one.
58
 It is important to 
note that all these developments were brought about by the South African courts without any 
form of statute being enacted to assist in the development of the housebreaking crime in 
South African law. The South African courts have been at the forefront in this development 
from the stage when the crime was inherited from the English law more than a century ago.     
 
The crime of housebreaking was developed as a means of protecting the security, sanctity, 
and privacy of the home.
59
 The purpose of the crime of housebreaking is to preserve the 
sanctity of the home or habitation against intrusions that involve danger or harm to the 
inhabitants.
60
 The purpose is “not so much to protect the dwellings as a building but to 
protect its security that represented the indefinable idea, existent at all times that the home 
was inviolable: every individual exercised their greatest freedom at home”.
61
 The nature of 
this crime provides that a person who enters another person‟s habitation with the intention to 
commit some crime within the premises can be punished even though he has proceeded no 
further in his criminal object than to force an entry into the premises.
62
 The law authorizes the 
criminalization of the offenders intending to commit some crime within the premises at a 
stage when the offender has not yet approached the commencement of the consummation of 
the intended crime by making entry with criminal intent an independent substantive crime.
63
 
With this early intervention of the law, the safety and security of the home and its inhabitants 
are improved.
64
 Our courts have shaped this crime in order to ensure that there is a maximum 
protection of South African societal interests at a very early stage by criminalizing the 
conduct of the offender at the stage when he has made his criminal intent known but before 
the crime or the offence is actually committed. The courts have, for years, fashioned this 
crime to suit South African societal needs. This fashioning has been effected without any 
legislative interference apart from only two provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act
65
 
relating to the crime of housebreaking.
66
  
                                                          
58 Ibid 795. 
59 Ibid 792. 
60 Ibid 792; Burchell (note 2 above) 744; Hoctor (note 52 above) 226-30.  
61 Ibid 792. 
62 Ibid 792; Burchell (note 2 above) 744. 
63 Ibid 793. 
64 Ibid 793. 
65 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 




Prior to the Union of South Africa in 1910, statutory forms of the crime of housebreaking 
were enacted by the four provincial legislatures; however, such statutes were not intended to 
override the common law version of the crime, but to supplement it.
67
 The purpose of those 
provincial statutes was to provide an alternative basis of criminal liability with reference to 
the prohibited conduct which overlapped with the ambit of the common law crime, and 
thereby extended the scope of the prohibited conduct as such.
68
 These provincial statutes 
were repealed by the General Law Third Amendment Act 29 of 1993, which created a 
national offence.
69
 The crime of housebreaking remained a common-law crime from as early 
as when it was inherited from English law until now and there has never been a stage when 
there has been any attempt to have it legislated for the purposes of creating a new national 
statutory crime of housebreaking.                
 
2.3 Elements of the crime  
 
2.3.1 Unlawfulness    
 
The unlawfulness element relates to the lack of consent by the owner or the lawful occupier 
of the premises to the breaking into and entering by the offender.
70
 There is no dispute 
amongst the criminal law writers relating to this element of the crime and it does not present 
any difficulties.
71
 For this element to be fulfilled, the entry into the premises must be 
unlawful.
72
 Where one breaks into and enters one‟s own premises, no crime is committed for 
the reason that this element has not been satisfied.
73
 
2.3.2 Intention     
    
This element relates to the intent to unlawfully break and enter the premises.
74
 The accused 
lacks intention if he believes that he is breaking into his own premises or that he is breaking 
                                                          
67 Hoctor (note 52 above) 75. 
68 Ibid 75. 
69 Ibid 76. 
70 Snyman (note 2 above) 40. 
71 Ibid 40. 
72 Milton (note 3 above) 796; Burchell (note 2 above) 746; Snyman (note 49 above) 548. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Burchell (note 2 above) 749; Snyman (note 49 above) 548. 
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and entering with the approval of the owner of the premises.
75





2.3.3 Additional Intention 
 
The additional intention refers to the intention of committing some crime or offence inside 
the premises at the time of breaking and entering since the housebreaking on its own does not 
constitute a crime or an offence.
77
 The further crime or offence intended to be committed by 
the accused inside the premises should be a different one from the housebreaking itself.
78
 If it 
is difficult or uncertain as to which crime or offence the accused intended to commit inside 
the premises, the possibilities are that he may either be charged with the crime of 
housebreaking with intent to contravene the provisions of the Trespass Act
79
 or the 
contravention of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.
80
 This form of intention is 
subject to criticism by various criminal law writers.
81
 It is also referred to as the second 
intention or the ulterior intention.
82
 Most criminal law writers have trenchantly criticised the 






Criminal law writers agree that this element cannot be dispensed with. Unlawful entry has 
been said to be the gravamen of the crime of housebreaking.
84
 It relates to the insertion by the 
accused of any part of his body into the premises or any instrument he is using for the 
purposes of insertion into the opening with the intention of thereby exercising control over 




                                                          
75 Snyman (note 49 above) 548. 
76 Snyman (note 2 above) 40. 
77 Snyman (note 49 above) 548. 
78 Milton (note 3 above) 805; Burchell (note 2 above) 749. 
79 Section 1 of the Trespass Act 6 of 1959. 
80 Section 95 (12) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
81 Snyman (note 2 above) 40, points out that the additional intention is one of the three elements or requirements that is 
subject to criticism. 
82 Snyman (note 2 above) 40. 
83 Snyman (note 2 above) 43. 
84 Snyman (note 2 above) 46. 
85 Snyman (note 49 above) 548; Burchell (note 2 above) 748; Milton (note 3 above) 801. 
13 
 
2.4 Proposed Reformation  
 
The crime of housebreaking operates as the pre-eminent preparatory offence as it is 
committed prior to the intended crime or the offence being achieved.
86
 It constitutes a species 
of attempt made substantive.
87
 It is one of the best known crimes in our law; however, its 
definitional structure reveals important shortcomings which sometimes lead to the arbitrary 
results in practice.
88
 All the authors of the textbooks on the criminal law are critical of the 
construction of this crime.
89
 It is not only the authors of criminal law textbooks who criticize 
the crime but also the South African courts that have the misgivings about it, as was the case 




 The court‟s criticism is welcomed and the 
proposed intervention by the legislature is fully supported by Snyman.
92
   
The first model has the least to recommend it because of the difficulties in applying and 
interpreting the „breaking‟, which cannot be solved simply by defining the „breaking‟ 
                                                          
86 S V Hoctor „The crime of housebreaking: To reform or to reformulate?‟ (2001) Obiter 163 163. 
87 Ibid 163. 
88 Snyman (note 2 above) 38. 
89 Ibid 38; Snyman mentions the various authors, namely, J C De Wet and H L Swanepoel (Strafreg 4ed (1985) 360-73); P 
M A Hunt (South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol II: Common-Law Crimes revised 2ed (1990) by J R L Milton 706, 
708); C R Snyman (Criminal Law 2ed (1989) 525, 529-30); Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (Principles of Criminal Law 
(1991) 542). 
90 Ngobeza (note 49 above) 610. 
91 Snyman (note 2 above) 38, 39 points out that the court regretted that the accused could not be convicted of some form of 
housebreaking since their moral culpability did not differ from that of a criminal who broke open a door in order to gain 
access to a building. Further points out that according to the court the interpretation of the meaning of the elements of the 
offence created unnecessary confusion and uncertainty; that the offence protects a person‟s rights to undisturbed habitation 
of his house or storage of his property, but the technicalities in the applicable legal rules created uncertainty; and that the 
time has come for the legislature to look into the matter and try and create legal certainty.   
92  Snyman (note 2 above) 38, 39 and 43-44; Snyman proposed five models for reform of the crime of housebreaking, 
namely,   
Firstly, the retention of the crime in its current or present form, but merely try to smooth its rough edges by statutorily 
defining its elements in such a way that most of the artificialities are removed from its ambit; 
Secondly, completely abolish the crime without replacing it with any new one. The housebreakers would be liable to be 
convicted of the malicious injury to property in respect of the breaking, of the contravention of the provisions of the Trespass 
Act 6 of 1959 in respect of entry and of the crime committed inside the premises, if any; 
Thirdly, reverting back to the original common law and treat housebreaking merely as a qualified form of the offence or the 
crime committed inside the premises, that is, treating unlawful entry as an aggravating form of the crime committed inside 
the premises, that is, treating unlawful entry as an aggravating form of the crime committed inside the premises; 
Fourthly, the adoption of the model found in jurisdictions on European continent and creating a new offence of unlawful 
entering or intruding on certain types of the premises; and  
Fifthly, opting for an amended version of the previous model by requiring the unlawful entering of the premises to be 
accompanied by an ulterior intention by the intruder, that is, an intention to commit some further crime or offence inside the 
premises.  
A possible weakness of the fourth possibility is that such a new offence would overlap with the trespass offence which is an 
already existing offence under Act 6 of 1959. This weakness might be overcome by preferring the fifth possibility, which is 
the solution that was adopted in England through section 9(1) (a) of the Theft Act 1968. The ulterior intent which requires the 
existence of intent to commit some unspecified offence inside is a wide description which would open the door to the 
charges alleging intent to trespass, which is unsatisfactory because the wrongdoer‟s very presence in the building already 
amounts to trespassing. Alternatively, the ulterior intent could be circumscribed by specifically listing the offences intended 
for commission inside, as is the position in terms of section 9 of the Theft Act of 1968 in England.     
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requirement in a certain way as the difficulties relating to this requirement are inherent in its 
very existence.
93
 This requirement should be discarded, as very little can be gained by simply 
redefining it.
94
 The second model does not appeal at all, as the abolition of the crime would 
leave a vacuum in the substantive criminal law.
95
 Merely falling back on the offence of 
trespassing coupled with the possible conviction of the malicious injury to property would 
not satisfy the undoubted need to treat the housebreakers separately.
96
 The moral turpitude of 
a housebreaker is more than that of a trespasser.
97
 The third model complements the fourth or 
fifth model instead of being an alternative and applies if the wrongdoer commits a crime after 
entering.
98
 If he is apprehended before execution of his ulterior intent, then the fourth or fifth 
models may apply.
99
 A combination of third and fourth or fifth makes it unnecessary to 





A combination of the third and fourth models is preferred to that of the fifth.
101
 The difficulty 
with this preferred model is that it negates the functioning of the crime of housebreaking as a 
preparatory crime and this pre-eminent feature is by definition excluded if the housebreaking 
merely serves as a qualification of a crime which has already been committed.
102
 In defining 
the crime this way, the true historical antecedents of the crime, contained principally in the 
common law, and in turn its antecedents and the South African law are ignored and the 
central rationale of the crime is discarded.
103
 The utility of the crime is lessened further in the 
jurisdictions which limit its functioning to an aggravation of theft.
104
 Unlawful entry is 
unsuited to the role of the „breaking‟ as it does not include any requirement that the intruder 
have any intent to commit a further crime or offence upon entry, and is obviously not 
punishing a preparatory crime, instead the harm being punished is simply an unlawful 
entry.
105
 The requirements of an entry and certain types of the premises cannot be thrown 
                                                          
93 Ibid 45. 
94 Ibid 45. 
95 Ibid 45. 
96 Ibid 45-46. 
97 Ibid 46.  
98 Ibid 46. 
99 Ibid 46. 
100 Ibid 46. 
101 Ibid 47. 
102 Hoctor (note 86 above) 168. 
103 Ibid 168. 
104 Ibid 168; Hoctor submits that other offences may equally be aggravated when committed under circumstances which 
amount to housebreaking. 
105 Ibid 169. 
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overboard; otherwise it would not be possible to replace the existing crime with any new 
offence.
106
 The best that can be done would be to circumscribe these requirements in such a 
way as to avoid most of the uncertainties.
107
    
 
There is a strong historical rationale for having a separate crime to punish the „breaking‟ or 
the unlawful entry, as a precursor to preventing possible serious harm inside the premises.
108
 
It functions as an important preparatory crime which operates distinctly from the law of 
attempts.
109
 Our courts can and do distinguish between the gravity of the completed crimes of 
housebreaking by differentiation of punishment.
110
 The crime of housebreaking is a very 
serious crime and the acts associated with it constitute an aggravated form of intrusion, which 
invariably results in psychological trauma.
111
 This crime operates to prevent the infringement 
of the universal social construct of territoriality in that it provides for the commission of the 
crime at the point of entry into the premises.
112
 The housebreaking act is aggravated 
compared to the trespassing act, in that it comprises an infringement of what someone has 
sought to secure and protect.
113
 In our law, intrusion into a building is customarily associated 
with housebreaking whereas trespassing usually relates to property rather than the buildings 
in practice.
114
 Trespass compares unfavorably with breaking and entering in terms of 
proximity to the commission of the crime, in that an act of breaking and entry goes beyond 
mere trespass.
115
 It is inappropriate to have a trespass offence punishing this peculiarly gross 
infringement of the territorial rights of another, which may lead to severe psychological 
repercussions.
116
 Accordingly, none of these proposed models should be used to replace the 




                                                          
106 Snyman (note 2 above) 47. 
107 Ibid 47. 
108 Hoctor (note 86 above) 165. 
109 Ibid 166. 
110 Ibid 166. 
111 Ibid 166. 
112 Ibid 166.  
113 Ibid 166. 
114 Ibid 166. 
115 Ibid 167.  
116 Ibid 169; Hoctor further points out that housebreaker‟s conduct has always been regarded as much more heinous than 
the thief. 




3. THE ‘BREAKING’ REQUIREMENT 
3.1 The South African Law Current Position 
3.1.1 The definition of ‘breaking’ requirement 
  
The third requirement in the definition of crime of housebreaking in South Africa is 
„breaking‟. For criminal liability to ensue there must be „breaking‟ into the premises.
118
 In 
other words, where the „breaking‟ element is lacking, there is no crime of housebreaking 
committed.
119
 To break into premises means to create a way into the premises by displacing 
some obstruction which forms part of the premises.
120
 Obstruction does not have to be a 
permanent attachment to the building.
121
 „Breaking‟ is a term of art in the sense that it can 
occur without any physical damage.
122
 This element reflected the basic notion of the English 
common law which effectively differentiated between accused who forced their way into a 
building and an accused who simply took advantage of an open door or window to gain 
access.
123
 By the inclusion of the „breaking‟ element the law made housebreaking a crime of 
forcible entry to a habitation as opposed to mere unlawful entry.
124
 “The English law 
principles relating to burglary were of a very strong persuasive value, if not authoritative in 
South African law.”
125
    
 
3.1.2 The nature of ‘breaking’ requirement   
 





 irrespective of whether such window or door was locked, 
                                                          
118 Burchell (note 2 above) 746. 
119 S V Hoctor „The „Breaking‟ requirement in the crime of housebreaking with intent‟ (1998) 19 2 Obiter  201, 204; S v 
Rudman 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) 385.  
120 Milton (note 3 above) 798; Burchell (note 2 above) 747.R v Fourie/Louw 1907 ORC 58; R v Mososa 1931 CPD 348; R v 
Makoelman 1932 EDL 194; R v Gomaseb 1936 SWA 16.    
121 S v Lekute 1991 2 SACR 221 (C); Snyman (note 49 above) 547; Hoctor (note 52 above) 22. 
122 Milton (note 3 above) 798; R v Faison 1952 (2) SA 671 (SR) 673. 
123 Milton (note 3 above) 798. 
124 Ibid 798. 
125 Hoctor (note 119 above) 204; Fourie/Louw (note 120 above) 58; the English definition of housebreaking was explicitly 
accepted.   
126 Fourie/Louw (note 120 above) 58; R v Crawford 1924 PH H5 (GW); Hoctor (note 119 above) 205.  





 When shaping and fashioning the boundaries of breaking, our courts 
generally seek to avoid the technicalities of the English law.
129
 A typical example is that in 
the former English law there was only a breaking if the point of entry that was partly open 
was widened by tampering with a fastening or locking device.
130
 The South African courts 
have never tried to fashion a definitive test as to the constitution of a displacement of an 
obstruction sufficient to effect an entry into the premises, instead they are dealing with each 
case on its own merits.
131
 However, in the case of Mososa
132
 the court held that if a 
householder had left a door or a casement window ajar, without taking steps to secure it so 




The facts in Mososa
134
 were that the accused had entered premises by pushing up a sash 
window, which had been left slightly open. The accused was interrupted in his act; hence 
nothing was stolen.
135
 This decision was trenchantly criticised by the court in S v Moroe
136
 
and some criminal law writers.
137
 In the case of Moroe,
138
 the court held that where the 
accused pushed a door which was slightly open, thereby further opening it, in order to enter 
premises with intent to steal, that conduct constitutes breaking.
139
 The question still persists 
                                                          
128 Milton (note 3 above)798, Hoctor (note 119 above) 205. 
129 Hoctor (note 119) 205.  
130 Ibid 205. 
131 Ibid 205. 
132 Mososa (note 120 above) 352. 
133 Milton (note 3 above) 799; Hoctor (note 119 above) 206; Mososa (note 120 above) 352.   
134 Mososa (note 120 above) 352. 
135 The judgment of Gardiner J P, as he then was, read as follows:     If the house is close to intruders, then the creation of 
an opening is a breaking. “Close to intruders” mean to all intruders, I should not be prepared to say that a breaking was 
committed where a stout man had to enlarge slightly an opening which would admit a thin one. A person who left his window 
in this condition could not be said to have closed it to intruders. There must be some displacement of the means adopted by 
the householder to exclude intruders. I should not be prepared to say that where a householder had left a door or a 
casement window ajar, without taking steps to secure that it did not swing open, a person who pushed it wider open 
committed a breaking.    
136 S v Moroe 1981 (4) SA 897 (O) 898-99, the court criticised the “fat-man” approach as flawed in the reasoning as it would 
demand that the courts will have to try to define the differences between a “stout” or “fat” and a “thin” accused.  
137 Milton (note 3 above) 799; Milton points out some pitfalls of this “fat-man” approach in the form of questions that „what is 
the girth of the average man?‟; „can one say the householder has secured his premises against intrusion if a small boy can 
get through, but not an average man?‟; he questions the significance of the distinction between a slightly or partially open 
casement window and sash window, whether the fact that one opens upwards and other inwards is the basis for an 
important legal distinction or not; „why should it matter whether the householder„s purpose was to exclude intruders or 
draughts?‟ He points out the danger of this approach that the difficulties will arise if we make „breaking‟ turn on the efficacy 
of the measures taken to keep intruders out and concludes that, „for as long as we accept that „breaking‟ is a term of art, 
there is no point in drawing distinctions and enunciating tests of the this kind as proposed by the court in the case of 
Mososa.‟ He correctly points out that the primary enquiry insofar as the displacement is concerned is whether part of the 
premises was displaced by the accused, whether householder thought he was excluding intruders is irrelevant, as is the 
stature of the accused. It is only when there is no displacement or trifling one is there no breaking. 
138 Moroe (note 136 above) 899.  
139 Ibid 899. 
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3.2 The Origin of the Controversy  
  
At one end of the scale, there does not seem to be any difficulties when an actual „breaking‟ 
occurs, that is, physical and literal breaking.
141
 The same cannot be said at the other end of 
the scale, as problems and difficulties still prevail relating to the position of the minimal cut-
off point or how little displacement is required before a breaking for the purposes of 
housebreaking is complete.
142
 The decision of the courts in S v Lekute
143
 and S v 
Hlongwane
144
 did not help in settling the difficulties and problems entailed by the concept of 
displacement for purposes of criminal liability. The issue as to what is the extent of the 




The physical and literal breaking is not confined to the actual physical damage to the 
premises; however, an actual „breaking‟ includes such actions as disconnecting the external 
burglar alarm of the premises or any similar act which overcomes the security of a building, 
for example, „breaking‟ by burning down part of a building or digging under a building.
146
 
The „breaking‟ requirement is prone to technicality and for it to be retained, it is necessary 
that it be defined so as to eliminate the subtleties associated with it.
147
 In practical terms, the 
rules relating to entry through an open, or partly open, window or door or an opening in the 
structure itself need to find consistent application.
148
 Treatment of the notion in South African 
law has resulted in the excluding from breaking of an entry through an opening which did not 
                                                          
140 Hoctor (note 119 above) 207. 
141 Ibid 207; For example, in R v Coetzee1958 (2) SA 8 (T), the Yale lock on the door of the office had been forced, then 
door opened and entry gained as a result. In R v George 1921 EDL 125, the accused had wrenched off the padlock and 
staple of the door with a pickaxe. In S v Ndhlovu 1963 (1) SA 926 (T), the accused was caught in the act of throwing the 
stone at the display case before the stone left his hand. In all these cases the courts did not experience any difficulties 
before concluding that the breaking element had been satisfied.      
142  Ibid 207. 
143 S v Lekute 1991 (2) SACR 221 (C), the court held that it was not necessary that the obstacle to be removed before the 
accused gains entry into the premises had to be of an immovable nature and the mere moving of blinds in an open window 
in gaining access to a house was sufficient to constitute housebreaking.     
144 S v Hongwane 1992 (2) SACR 484 (N), the court accepted that accused was responsible for moving the curtain, 
however, such did not meet the required displacement of some obstruction which forms part of the premises and held that 
displacement of curtains could not amount to a breaking. 
145 Hoctor (note 119 above) 208. 
146 Ibid 221 gives Scots case as the authority for this submission, that is, Burns v Allan 1987 SCCR 449, where the court 
held that an alarm system is an integral part of the security of a building, and to disconnect it is an attempt to overcome that 
security.   
147 Ibid 222. 
148 Ibid 222. 
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require any displacement of an obstacle, this being indicative that the old common law 
rationale of „implied invitation‟ still holds sway.
149
 It has been due to the problems inherent 
in this approach that there have been calls for reform of this requirement.
150
 With regard to 
the situation in S v Ngobeza
151
 where the accused had climbed in through a hole in the 




The acceptance of English law by our courts regarding breaking inside the premises 
complicates the description of the breaking requirement further.
153
 This form of 




 The court in Xabela 
held that the opening of an interior or inner door constitutes housebreaking.
156
 However, no 
reasons were given and no authorities quoted.
157
 Support for the court‟s view is found in the 
English textbooks by Russell and Roscoe, which lay down as the English law position that 
the opening of an inner door to commit a crime inside is burglary.
158
  The court concluded 
that there appears no reason why the English law should not be accepted.
159
 So, the current 
position is that where the accused does not commit any external breaking but breaks into the 
inner portion of the premises, such conduct is „breaking‟ in South African law.
160
 The 
problem in inner breaking cases will usually not be whether there is a breaking, but whether 




Although the degree and nature of displacement may be controversial, it appears to be 
accepted that, if there is no displacement of any part of the premises, there is no breaking.
162
 
                                                          
149 Ibid 222. 
150 Ibid 222 referring to the case of Ngobeza (note 49 above) 610, as a good example of the problems created by the 
technical distinctions.   
151 Ngobeza (note 49 above) 610. 
152 Hoctor (note 119 above) 223, cites the case of Knotts v State (Tex Crim App 1895) 32 SW Rep 532 which held that 
crawling through a hole was a breaking under the Texas Statute. 
153 Hoctor (note 119 above) 208; R v Shela and Others 1950 (2) PH H 193 (W) 361, Malan, J. followed the decision of the 
case of R v Xabela 1945 PH H 282 (T) which laid down that the opening of an inner door constitutes breaking, relying solely 
on the English authorities and concluded that there is no reason why the English law should not be accepted on the 
question of opening an inner door. As a result of these two case laws this principle became part of South African law. Heyns 
v Regina 1956 (2) PH H 247 (C) and Coetzee (note 141 above) 8, both followed Xabela and Shela decisions.  
154 Xabela (note 153 above) H282 
155 Hoctor (note 119 above) 209. 
156 Xabela (note 153 above) H282. 
157 Hoctor (note 119 above) 209.  
158 Ibid 209. 
159 Xabela (note 153 above), Ibid 209. 
160 Hoctor (note 119 above) 209. 
161 Milton (note 3 above) 798. 
162 Hoctor (note 119 above) 209. 
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Where the accused has walked through an open door he does not commit housebreaking.
163
 
The position is the same where the accused has climbed through an open window.
164
 There is 
no breaking where the accused has put his hand through a pre-existing hole in a window.
165
 
There is also no breaking where the accused has climbed through a skylight.
166
 Where 
accused displaces something which does not form part of the premises whilst on his way to 
the premises to commit crime; such displacement does not constitute breaking.
167
 However, 
there were two exceptions to the „no displacement, no breaking‟ rule in English common law, 
meaning that these exceptions were applicable in pre-1968 English law.
168
   
 
3.2.1 English common-law exceptions 
 
The exceptions were applicable in English law before the Theft Act
169
 was promulgated in 
1968.  
 
3.2.1.1 First exception 
 
The first exception was that, if accused had descended down a chimney, he was considered to 




 Gane A J, in support of 
applying the chimney rule in South African law, quoted a passage in Gardiner and 
                                                          
163 The court in Makoelman (note 120 above) 194 held that there was no evidence that the cellar door was locked, closed or 
it had a door; as such the conviction by the magistrate of housebreaking under the circumstances was not justified. In R v 
Moyana 1921 EDL 139, the court held that there was no evidence to show whether or not the office had been open or 
closed when the accused entered. The conviction and sentence in respect of housebreaking were quashed.  
164 In Gomaseb (note 120 above) 16, the court held that by climbing through the broken window accused had not committed 
housebreaking. In Rudman (note 119 above) 368, the court held that an unlawful entry into the premises through an open 
window does not constitute a breaking in. The court arrived at the same conclusion in S v Maunatlala 1982 (1) SA 877 (T).    
165 In R v Chalala 1947 (3) SA 62 (O), accused had put his hand through the store‟s ventilation aperture and stole matches. 
In S v Dyentyi 1973 PH H40 (T), accused had pushed a piece of wire through a narrow gap between the show window and 
the door of a shop and had by that managed to extract certain pieces of clothing.      
166 In R v Mamawecke 1939 (2) PH H 178 (SR), accused had entered through an open space between the roof and the tops 
of the walls of the dwelling house and whilst inside he opened a closed window and removed some articles. It was held that 
neither the entry through an open space nor the opening of an inside window constituted housebreaking. 
167 In Makoelman (note 120 above) 194, accused  forced open the yard-door of the store by the breaking of a padlock. The 
court held that the breaking into the yard as a preliminary to entering the cellar was not a housebreaking. In Ngobeza (note 
49 above) 610, accused had cut a hole in the wire and climbed through a security fence to gain access to the warehouse 
premises.      
168 Milton (note 3 above) 800; Hoctor (note 119 above) 210. 
169 The Theft Act of 1968 of England changed the position; in terms of which the crime of burglary became a statutory 
offence and the breaking element was done away with.   
170 Milton (note 3 above) 800; Hoctor (note 119 above) 210. 





 The court disagreed with the notion of extending breaking to open 
skylights; however, it supported the notion of including chimneys in the definition of 
„breaking‟.
173
 Gane A J, quoted the English authority,
174
 which held that an entry by chimney 
was a breaking, but a hole in the roof, left open for the purpose of light, may be entered 
without a breaking being committed in law.
175
 Despite judicial approval and application of 
the rule in South African law, Milton still has reservations about this rule being imported, 
referring to it as an arbitrary exception and not worthy of import.
176
 It has also been argued 





3.2.1.2 Second Exception 
 
The second exception is the doctrine of constructive breaking, in terms of which „breaking‟ is 
considered to have taken place where a person secures admission to premises by the use of 
some trick, artifice, fraud, or colluding with any other person within the premises.
178
 It is 
questionable whether South African law has adopted this doctrine; however, there are aspects 
of the doctrine which have been accepted in South African law, for example, where a threat 
of force has been used to compel a third party to „break‟ the premises.
179
 The person who 
made use of threat can be convicted of housebreaking with intent to commit crime on the 
principle of qui facit per alium facit per se (qui facit rule).
180
 The principle also applies where 
the owner of the premises, whilst acting under duress, opens a door to admit the accused.
181
 
This principle means that he who commits the crime through another, he commits it 
                                                          
172 Ibid 195; Gardiner and Lansdown South African Criminal Law 3ed 1123 read “The meaning of “breaking” has, in practice, 
been extended to cover an entry by means of a chimney, or an open skylight, though no physical displacement of any part 
of the material of the structure occurs.” Gane A J, in his judgment, held: I have not been able to discover any Roman-Dutch 
authority which would justify such an extension in the case of an open skylight. English law does not support such an 
extension in the case of an open sky-light or similar aperture. A case of a chimney is different for it is a necessary opening in 
every house which needs protection. If a man chooses to leave an opening in the wall or roof of his, instead of a fastened 
window, he must take the consequences. The entry through such an opening is not a breaking.  
173 Hoctor (note 119 above) 210.  
174 R v Brice (1821) Russ & Ry 450 and R v Spriggs & Hancock (1834) 1 Mood & R 357. 
175 Makoelman (note 120 above) 195; Hoctor (note 119 above) 211.  
176 Milton (note 3 above) fn 71, 800 opines that this rule is not part of South African law. It seems to have been somewhat 
arbitrary exception and not worthy of import; and argues that “just as a man may glass in an opening in his wall, so he may 
have a chimney such as cannot be entered from outside”.       
177 Hoctor (note 119 above) 225 quotes Enemeri, 414.   
178 Hoctor (note 119 above) 211; Milton (note 3 above) 800, describes it as giving entry to premises by force or fraud and 
Hoctor submits that this description is little simplistic, as constructive breaking consists not of entry to premises gained by 
force but by threat of force.   
179 Hoctor (note 119 above) 211 
180 S v Cupido 1975 (1) SA 537 (C). 





 The principle also applies where the owner of the premises, whilst acting under 




1.2.1.2.1 Threats, duress and intimidation  
 
Constructive breaking in the form of threat, duress or intimidation was dealt with in S v 
Cupido
184
 and the unreported decision of Appellate Division in S v Robyn on 02 October 
1972.
185
 The Appellate Division decided the matter on the basis of principle, rather than 
precedent and applied the qui facit per alium facit per se rule which meant that the 
perpetrator of the crime can commit the unlawful conduct through an innocent agent and be 
held liable on this basis.
186
 Liability flowing from the acts of an innocent agent amounts to a 
repetition of the English doctrine of “innocent agency”, which has never been part of South 
African law.
187
 If the court accepts that „breaking‟ can occur through the fear-motivated 
actions of another, then it accepts that this form of „constructive breaking‟ forms part of 
South African law.
188
 Hoctor submits that in preference to attempting to found liability on the 
qui facit rule where accused obtains access by means of duress or threats, thus using the 
owner or householder as an “instrument” to gain entry, this should simply be regarded as 
breaking.
189
 By adopting this approach, the primary focus of the enquiry relates to lack of 
consent on the part of the owner or occupant of the premises.
190
 The view of Hoctor is to be 
preferred to that of Milton that this form of constructive breaking has to form part of our law.  
 
1.2.1.2.2 Fraud, trick and artifice 
  
It does not appear that the question of fraud, trick or artifice has ever arisen in our courts.
191
 
The common law notion of „breaking‟ includes constructive breaking, that is, entry effected 
                                                          
182 S V Hoctor „Constructive Breaking - A Constructive Part of The Housebreaking Crime?‟ (2005) Obiter 726, 727. 
183 Milton (note 3 above) 800. 
184 Cupido (note 180 above) 537. In this case one of the four accused had held the doorkeeper‟s arm fast in such a way that 
the doorkeeper could not break free of the accused‟s grip; therefore,  being afraid, he unlocked the gate, allowing all four 
accused to walk into the premises and dispossess him of the key. 
185 Hoctor (note 182 above) 727; In the Robyn case, a marauder had threatened to burn the house down if the door was not 
opened for him and the door was consequently opened.  
186 Ibid 727. 
187 Ibid 727-28 quotes Visser and Vorster‟s General Principles of Criminal Law Through the cases 3ed (1990) 681. 
188 Ibid 728. 
189 Ibid 728. 
190 Ibid 728. 
191 Ibid 729. 
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by means of fraud or threats.
192
 In S v Maisa,
193
 the accused had obtained a key to the 
premises through fraud, and then entered into the premises.
194
 The appeal court confirmed 





, the question was raised whether entry obtained by fraud could be 
regarded as a breaking.
197
 The court declined to comment on what the legal position would be 
where entry to premises was obtained by fraud or trick, regarding it as unnecessary for the 




According to Milton, there is no South African authority on the doctrine and he submits that 
it is not part of our law.
199
 Gardiner and Lansdown
200
 disapproved of the possibility of 
constructive breaking being part of South African law; however, they state that the meaning 
of „breaking‟ has been extended to cover entrance by means of a chimney, citing English case 
authority of R v Brice
201
 and R v Spriggs and Hancock
202
 in this regard as their authority.
203
 
Such an approach is inconsistent, and entry procured through fraud should equally form part 
of „breaking‟.
204
 Clearly, these authors accepted this exceptional form of breaking as part of 
South African law, notwithstanding their rejection of the doctrine of constructive breaking.
205
 
It is not clear as to why these scholars preferred to accept the exception relating to the 
chimney as part of South African law and not the doctrine of constructive breaking, yet their 
authority for reliance on the chimney exception is entirely based on English common law, 
which is the source of both these exceptions.  
 
It has been submitted that a better approach is to enquire whether there is consent to the 
specific conduct or not, requiring for the purposes of liability that there be a causal link 
between deception and harm, such that the deceit deprived the complainant of the ability to 
                                                          
192 Hoctor (note 119 above) 222. 
193 S v Maisa 1968 (1) SA 271 (T). 
194 Hoctor (note 182 above) 729. 
195 Ibid 729. 
196 Cupido (note 180 above) 537.  
197 Hoctor (note 182 above) 729. 
198 Ibid 730. 
199 Milton (note 3 above) 800; Gardiner and Lansdown South African Law and Procedure Vol. II: Specific Offences 6ed 
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exercise his will in relation to his physical integrity with respect to the activity in question.
206
 
The advantages of this approach are the following: it focuses on the liability of the accused; it 
applies the principles relating to deception equally to the crime of housebreaking as they 
apply to property crimes such as theft; and it accords with autonomy.
207
 There is no good 
reason for protecting a property interest more rigorously than the “psychological trauma and 
sense of violation invariably accompanying housebreaking”.
208
 Only consent obtained 
without negating the voluntary agency of the complainant is legally valid in order to 




The South African law should also follow the principles of constructive breaking.
210
 This is, 
indeed, a better approach for the reason that, once it has been established, there exists a link 
between the deception practised by the accused and the harm which befell the complainant; 
there can be no talking of the consent thereafter. It is submitted that where the entrance was 
obtained as a result of fraud, trick or artifice, it should be regarded as a form of „breaking‟. 
This is, in fact, a worse form of housebreaking, where the owner or occupant of the premises 
is made to believe that a certain fact exists, which is a misrepresentation, and as a result of 
that a housebreaker is allowed ingress to the premises and the harm follows after that. The 
question should be: would the complainant have allowed the entry into the premises had he 
known of the correct facts? If the answer is negative, then breaking has occurred. However, if 
the answer is affirmative, then there is no breaking as the entrance would have been allowed 
anyway.   
 
1.2.1.2.3 Collusion with a collaborator within the premises 
 
Another form of the constructive breaking doctrine is collusion with a collaborator within the 
premises.
211
 This would include the situation where one person had a conspiracy with 
someone lawfully on the premises and where the latter opened the door for the former.
212
 
Both would be liable for burglary.
213
 There could be no „breaking‟ if the servant opened the 
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door whilst acting under the instructions of the police or his master as the door would have 
been lawfully open.
214
 However, where a servant gave a key to the accused in order to set a 
trap for him, with the knowledge of the master, and the accused made a duplicate set of keys 
with which he opened the door, this was held to be a breaking.
215
 In R v Tusi,
216
 the scenario 
was dealt with where the accused obtained ingress through an associate (an employee), who 
had hidden within the premises, and opened the door to allow them to enter.
217
 The court 
found liability on the basis of a common purpose between the accused and the person inside 
the premises, and held that the persons acting under common purpose had effected a 
„breaking‟.
218
 This decision was approved in S v Maelangwe,
219
 where the door had been 
opened by another person to allow ingress to the accused.
220
 The court held that there was a 
common purpose between the accused and his associates and those who entered the premises 




Hoctor submits that a better approach would be to regard collusion with a collaborator within 
the premises as a form of „breaking‟.
222
 In other words, the fact of the opening of the door 
fulfills the breaking requirement, and therefore liability for housebreaking would be found.
223
 
Common purpose constitutes an infringement of the presumption of innocence and ought to 
be avoided wherever possible.
224
 One finds oneself inclined to agree with Hoctor‟s view for 
the reason that for purposes of proof, all that is required is whether the door was closed or 
open; it would not matter as to the circumstances under which the door was open. So, once it 
has been established that a closed door was open, the requirement of „breaking‟ has been met 
and each accused is individually liable. Common purpose may be invoked in a situation 
where the evidence shows that one or some of the accused never entered the premises, for 
example, where the driver of a get-away car remained behind whilst others went in and out of 
the premises to bring items to be loaded into the car. 
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The notion of breaking has been primarily shaped by English law precedent.
225
 South African 
writers have been reluctant to accept the doctrine of constructive breaking per se; however, 
the South African legal position in relation to entry by threats or duress, as well as entry 
through the means of a collaborator on the premises, accords with the principles of 
constructive breaking.
226
 Where the situation is doubtful is with the existence of entry 
through fraud or trick.
227
 It is submitted that there is no reason why the English law doctrine 
of constructive breaking should not be accepted into our law. It does not make any sense to 
accept only certain forms of constructive breaking and not accept other forms, in particular 
entry obtained fraudulently or trickily.    
 
3.2.2 The exclusion of ‘breaking out’ 
 
There was uncertainty whether the „breaking‟ requirement could be satisfied by a „breaking 
out‟ of the premises.
228
 „Breaking out‟ would occur where accused enters the premises 
unlawfully for some criminal purpose, unaccompanied by a breaking in, then breaks out of 
the premises to effect his escape.
229
 This remained a matter of some dispute in the early 
English law until it was resolved in 1713 by means of legislation which declared a breaking 
out sufficient for burglary and this remained the law in England until the passing of the Theft 
Act of 1968.
230
 In R v Thuis
231
 and R v Gomaseb,
232
 the accused had broken the windows 
from inside the premises in order to facilitate their escape. The possibility of housebreaking 
liability was not considered; instead the courts were either concerned with whether the 
intention of the accused in breaking into the premises was unlawful or chose not to express an 
opinion on the matter.
233
 In R v Steyn,
234
 Horwitz A J, cited the English authority of R v 
Joseph Wheeldon,
235
 when he stated that a lodger may be guilty of „breaking out‟ of the 
premises in English law.
236
 However, there was no indication whether court regards this as 
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authoritative for the purposes of South African law.
237
 In R v Mamawecke,
238
 Hudson J, held 
that the opening of an inside window does not constitute housebreaking either actual or 
constructive.
239
 The court in R v Shelembe
240
 indicated that it seems that the accepted general 
rule is that a „breaking out‟ does not constitute housebreaking for purposes of this crime.
241
 
The court in S v Maunatlala
242
 held that the act of opening a door or window from inside in 
order to leave the premises with stolen goods would not amount to housebreaking and 
suggested that legislation be enacted to resolve the problem.
243
 „Breaking out‟ does not 
amount to breaking for purposes of housebreaking.
244
 Breaking and entering must be directed 
at facilitating the intended offence.
245
 Breaking after the offence has been committed cannot 
be housebreaking since that is purely breaking out and not breaking in, which means that 
there will be no entering after the breaking but exiting instead.
246
 The element of breaking 
must be alleged in the charge sheet or indictment, whatever the case may be.
247
 Milton likens 
the „breaking out‟ to the assault in the crime of robbery, which must be employed in order to 
induce submission to the taking, and the vice versa does not suffice for robbery.
248
 In other 
words, once theft precedes assault, under no circumstances can a liability for robbery ensue. 




A possible justification for allowing breaking out to suffice for housebreaking cases 
involving theft is the “continuous crime” doctrine.
250
 The court in R v Attia
251
 dealt with this 
doctrine. To allow „breaking out‟ to transform the crime committed inside the premises into a 
second completed offence is undesirable, and the need to consider such an extension is 
obviated by the elimination of technical requirements to breaking, which allows 
housebreakers to enter premises without fulfilling the „breaking‟ requirement.
252
 It is 
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submitted that this is the correct approach. If „breaking out‟ were to be allowed to be part of 
our law, it would have necessitated that the definition of the crime of housebreaking be 
altered insofar as the element of „breaking into‟ is concerned. All the scholars and the courts 
are in agreement with this requirement. The requirement of „breaking into‟, by necessary 
implication, excludes „breaking out‟. Thus „breaking out‟ should not form part of our law.               
  
3.2.3 A right to ‘break’ 
 
If the accused has a legal right to enter the premises, even if he breaks the premises with the 
intent to commit a crime, such a „breaking‟ cannot amount to housebreaking.
253
 In the case of 
Andries,
254
 the accused had been in the employ of the complainant for two years at the time 
of the commission of the crime, and the court held that it is reasonably possible that the 
accused entered the house for a lawful purpose and only decided to look for something to 
steal when he was already inside.
255
 In the Ovamboland
256
 case, the accused customarily 
entered the premises to deliver milk. In the Steyn
257
 case, both the accused and complainant 
were lodgers and occupied the same room. In the Faison
258
 case, both accused and 
complainant shared a hut and both had keys fitting the padlock. In all these cases, the courts 
concluded that the requirement of „breaking‟ was not satisfied for the reason that the accused 
had a legal right to be on the premises where the crimes were committed. There has not been 
any dispute or any different point of view relating to these decisions. Thus the position in our 
law should remain as it is in relation to this aspect.  
 
3.3 The importance of the ‘breaking’ requirement 
 
There have been calls for the abolition of the „breaking‟ requirement in South African law.
259
 
However, the „breaking‟ requirement is at the heart of the original crime of housebreaking or 
burglary.
260
 It is still an essential part of the definition of the crime of housebreaking in South 
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African law and a number of common law jurisdictions.
261
 The purpose of the „breaking‟ 
must be to facilitate or cause entry into the premises, that is, to enable the violation of the 
security of the premises.
262
 There is an inherent limitation on the scope of the crime in the 
breaking requirement, so that a mere trespassory entry is excluded from the ambit of the 
crime.
263
 Trespassory entry cannot be equated to housebreaking, both notionally and 
practically.   
 
There are three fundamental arguments in favour of the retention of the „breaking‟ 
requirement, namely, the nature of the crime, the scope of the crime, and the internal balance 
of the elements within the crime.
264
 Relating to the nature of the crime, „breaking‟ is the 
primary focus and historic rationale of housebreaking.
265
 Housebreaking is based upon the 
idea of a positive „breaking in‟ rather than a mere unauthorised entry.
266
 It is essential that 
there should be a very clear distinction between housebreaking on one hand and trespass on 
the other hand, if the autonomous crime of housebreaking is to be retained.
267
 Housebreaking 
is universally regarded as wrongful criminal behaviour, whereas trespass is at most a 
statutory offence.
268
 A trespassory offence may be classified as falling within the category of 
regulatory offences in contrast to housebreaking, whereas common-law crimes generally 
have a „moral‟ dimension which may be lacking in statutory offences, and thus are vested 
with greater authority.
269
 The retention of the „breaking‟ element is of primary importance.
270
 
The importance of the „breaking‟ requirement is borne out by the fact that the word 
„breaking‟ always features in the shortened version of the crime, for example, 
„housebreaking‟, „crime of housebreaking‟, and „housebreaking crime‟. The „breaking‟ 
element is the hub of the crime of housebreaking, without breaking, there could be no crime 
of housebreaking in existence as is currently known.          
 
The retention of the „breaking‟ requirement is necessary to restrict the scope of the crime.
271
 
The elimination of the „breaking‟ requirement “may lead to an unwarranted broadening of the 
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behaviour content of this law”.
272
 There are problems with the substitution of a trespass for a 
„breaking‟ as this would invariably transform every shoplifter into a housebreaker.
273
 The 
general invitation of the shopkeeper does not extend to those entering for the sole purpose of 
shoplifting.
274
 According to this unwarranted broadening of the behaviour content approach, 
anyone entering a shop for the sole purpose of murdering the manager is a trespasser and 
therefore a burglar; so is the one who robs the manager at gunpoint in his office, which is 
made inaccessible to the public by a “no entry” sign on the open door, and escapes with the 
takings.
275
 These examples would be regarded as offences against property and no assault on 
the particular values protected by the housebreaking crime, that is, the protection of the 
owner or occupant against the “psychological trauma and sense of violation invariably 
accompanying a housebreaking”.
276
 The elimination of the „breaking‟ requirement is 
inappropriate, as such would invariably lead to the extension of the crime of housebreaking to 
cover the above mentioned situations.
277
 Moreover, there is an unwelcome blurring of the 
boundaries between housebreaking and robbery in the second example.
278
 The retention of 
the „breaking‟ requirement in the crime of housebreaking would exclude both of the above 




The „breaking‟ requirement acts as a safeguard against the oversubjectivisation of 
housebreaking.
280
 The ancient common law crime of burglary was rooted in the pattern of 
criminality expressed in the „breaking‟, while the modern legislative trend of dispensing with 
the „breaking‟ requirement takes the pattern of subjective criminality to extremes.
281
 A 
process of subjectivisation, allied to the elimination of „breaking‟, renders the proof of intent 
extremely difficult.
282
 The existence of the „breaking‟ requirement in the crime of 
housebreaking makes it easier to establish the intention of the accused at the earliest possible 
stage of his nefarious activity. Without the „breaking‟ requirement, there is no way of 
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establishing the intention of the accused at the precise moment of his entry into the premises.  
 
Other jurisdictions have taken a different approach, which amounts to regarding an entry 
which occurs through an opening which is not ordinarily used as a means of entrance, that is, 
„unusual entry‟ as breaking.
283
 The concern is not so much whether the opening existed for 
any necessary purpose, but whether it was intended to be ordinarily used as a means of 
entrance into the building.
284
 The question of whether an opening in a building is intended for 
human entrance is one of fact.
285
 The householder may leave an opening for purposes of 
allowing a pet to use it when coming in and going out of the building. Such an opening 
cannot be said to be intended for human entrance. So, if anyone were to use such an opening 
to gain entry into the building through it with intention to commit a crime inside, he would 
have broken into the premises.     
 
The „breaking‟ requirement should continue to be an indispensable element of the crime of 
housebreaking as is the position currently.
286
 To offer protection to all forms of structures, 
then the correct approach would be to admit all manner of breaking within the definition of 
the crime.
287
 In order to solve the difficulties which arise from the open window scenario, the 
concept of „breaking‟ currently employed by our courts should be extended to include any 
entry by unusual means, that is, in any way but through an open door.
288
 The „breaking‟ 
requirement should continue to form part of the crime of housebreaking for the reason that it 
is the primary focus of the crime and its inclusion is necessary to restrict the scope of the 
crime and act as a safeguard against the over-subjectivisation of housebreaking.
289
 The act of 
breaking has been accepted as objective proof of the intent to commit further harm within the 
premises.
290
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4. THE ‘PREMISES’ REQUIREMENT   
4.1 The origin of the ‘Premises’ Requirement 
 
The „premises‟ requirement is the fifth requirement in the definition of the crime of 
housebreaking.
292
 The origins of the crime of housebreaking are bound up with the need to 
protect the dweller in his abode.
293
 The original purpose of the crime of housebreaking was 
the protection of the sanctity of the home.
294
 The interest of a person in the safe and private 
habitation of his home has been treated reverently and regarded as deserving of a special 
protection by the law from the earliest times.
295
 This concern is reflected by the fact that the 
common-law jurisdictions have typically classified the crime of housebreaking as a crime 
against the habitation which implies the right to feel secure in one‟s own home.
296
 The issue 
of architecture was at the heart of the common law crime of burglary and housebreaking.
297
 
The focus of the common-law rules of burglary was primarily upon the „premises‟ which 
were used for human habitation.
298
 The original term used in defining the burglary was a 
“mansion house”; however, the term was understood to include a far wider conception of the 




The similar considerations were applicable as are relevant to the ancient crime of 
‘hamesucken’, that is, as the crime constitutes a violation of the security of the habitation, by 
defining the crime to be confined to the actual dwellings.
300
 Where the „premises‟ had been 
broken into, which were not used for the dwelling purpose, the crime was not committed.
301
 
The common law limitation has largely been abolished.
302
 With broadening of the ambit of 
the crime beyond merely protecting the habitation, the differing approaches have been taken 
in defining the nature of the „premises‟ that can be broken into.
303
 The simple distinction has 
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become blurred as our courts include within the concept of the „premises‟ places not used for 
the human habitation but for storage which were closely associated with the home itself.
304
 
Thus the crime may now be committed in any building or any part of the building which 
means that the physical restrictions on the „premises‟ have been done away with thereby 
protecting intrusion into all the „buildings‟ or any „house‟.
305
 The words, a „house‟, a 
„premises‟, a „structure‟, and a „building‟, are used interchangeably as they are all referring to 
the physical structure in respect of which the crime of housebreaking can be committed.  
 
4.2 Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
In many jurisdictions, the „building‟ notion for the purposes of the crime has gone beyond the 
natural meaning of the word.
306
 Thus not only the temporary „structures‟, but also the ships or 
the vessels, and the vehicles have been included within the ambit of the crime.
307
 In English 
law, the „structure‟ is required to have some degree of permanence
308
 and the inhabited 
vehicle or vessel is specifically included in the term „building.‟
309
 Intrusions into the 
uncompleted „buildings‟ may be included as well as the tents; however, the tents were 
excluded by the case law in Canada.
310
 In Canada, the breaking and entering include, within 
understanding of the „structure‟ which can be broken into and entered, the spaces enclosed by 
the fence, but exclude the unenclosed spaces.
311
 The argument that the crime may be 
committed in any „house‟ and that the nature of the place was irrelevant is stating the position 
too broadly.
312
 The content of the element must conform to the ratio for the crime and thus 
needs to be limited accordingly.
313
  
The early common-law test was whether the „premises‟ in question should be accorded the 
protection of the burglary law relating to permanency of the dwelling.
314
 This is no longer 
applied in the modern jurisdictions, even where the statutory requirement is the „dwelling-
house‟ as the „dwelling‟ can be a very rudimentary „building‟, provided that the person sleeps 
                                                          
304 Milton (note 3 above) 802. 
305 Hoctor (note 297 above) 128. 
306 Ibid 128. 
307 Ibid 128. 
308 In terms of section 9 (1) of the Theft Act of 1968; Hoctor (note 293 above) 417. 
309 In terms of section 9 (4) Theft Act 1968; Hoctor (note 293 above) 417. 
310 Hoctor (note 297 above) 128, citing a Canadian case of Eldridge (1944) 81 CCC 388 (BCCA) and Law Reform 
Commission of Canada Working Paper 48: Criminal Intrusions (1986) 10 which criticised the ruling as “difficult to justify”.  
311 Section 348 of the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c.C-46; Hoctor (note 293 above) 417.  
312 Hoctor (note 297 above) 128. 
313 Ibid 128-29. 
314 Ibid 129. 
34 
 
in it on the continuous basis.
315
 The size of the building is generally not a factor for as long as 
the building is enclosed.
316
 The factors of permanency and the size may be important where 
the statute distinguishes between a „dwelling-house‟ and a „building‟.
317
 The position has not 
been definitively resolved in South Africa, although it can at least be accepted that it is 
incorrect to state that the breaking into and entering can only be in respect of an immovable 
„structure‟, and cannot be committed by breaking into a movable structure.
318
       
 
4.3 The Current Position in the South African Law 
 
It is now well-established that the word „house‟ in the „housebreaking‟ has acquired a special 
or technical meaning.
319
 The word „house‟ is a term of art as there are many types of the 
„premises‟ in respect of which the crime can be committed which a layman would scarcely 











 an immovable display cabinet separate from but forming an integral 
portion of a shop,
325
 a cabin on board ship,
326
 a small but heavily built concrete mine 
dynamite magazine,
327




 It is not easy to enunciate a general definition of 
the „premises‟ and there must always be the borderline cases in which the distinction between 




The courts have generally adopted a common-sense approach.
331
 This has been the general 
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principle which our courts have been consistently applying since then.
332
 This definition 







the purpose may ultimately be determinative.
336
 The „premises‟ is most often a house, a 
storeroom, a business premises, an outbuilding or a factory.
337
 It has often been said that the 
„premises‟ must be the structure in the nature of a house.
338
 This proposition is somewhat 
misleading as a more accurate one would be that there is a structure or part of it that is in the 






 adopted the first part of Gardiner and Lansdown definition and proceeded to add 
“three relevant and closely related factors”, to wit:  
 
 whether what has been broken and entered is a structure or part of a structure in the 
nature of a house or storeroom, for example, a wardrobe,
341
 and a built-in cupboard
342
 
were not regarded as structures „in the nature of a house‟;  
 whether the structure is, or may ordinarily be, used for human habitation or the 
storage of property;
343
 and        





This explanation has remained in the work under the subsequent authorship of Milton
345
 and 
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The fundamental purpose of a dwelling house is as a human habitation.
347
 This position 
remains even though it may temporarily stand empty.
348
 A seaside cottage is intended for 
human habitation.
349
 If the house were to be permanently abandoned both for habitation and 
storage purposes, it would cease to be the „premises‟.
350
 A more solid structure would usually 
qualify as the „premises‟, if its permanent purpose is the storage of goods, even if it is 
movable and fairly small.
351
 Our courts have held some structures to be the „premises‟, 
namely, an officer‟s cabin on a ship,
352
 a caravan a motor car can tow,
353
 a tent wagon used as 
a residence,
354
 a tent permanently used or intended for human habitation,
355
 a built-in 
cupboard,
356
 and a safe acceded to the immovable premises.
357
 Other structures have been 
held not to be qualifying as the „premises‟, namely, a railway truck used for conveying 
goods,
358
 a motor car, although it is a permanently storing place for a spare wheel and 
tools,
359
 a fence surrounding the „premises‟,
360
 a fowl-run made of tubes and wire netting,
361
 a 
tent standing next to a caravan,
362
 and a chest of drawers.
363
 A stricter approach or test is 
applied when the thing is not used or intended for human habitation than when it is.
364
 A tent 
permanently used or intended to be used to store goods may not be the „premises‟ because it 




The „premises‟ begin on the interior of the boundary wall, door or window for the purposes 
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of entry determination otherwise the distinction between the „breaking‟ and „entering‟ would 
disappear.
366
 There may be „premises‟ within „premises‟, for instance, each room in a house, 
and each flat in a block of flats.
367
 In a situation where the accused breaks into and enters 
numerous „premises‟ as part of one operation, a common-sense approach must be adopted.
368
 
The question is whether the accused‟s conduct considered in all its circumstances, constitutes 
more than one offence.
369
    
 
It is difficult to deduce from the cases a general principle that can be applied in order to 
decide whether a particular premises or structure qualifies as one in respect of which the 
crime can be committed.
370
 If the structure is used for human habitation, it does not matter 
whether it is a movable or immovable; but if it is used for the storage of goods, it must be 
immovable.
371
 This conclusion seems to tally in broad outline with the case law; however, it 




 This case brought a new 
perspective on the problems inherent in defining the boundaries of the „premises‟ concept.
374
 
The magistrate had applied the De Wet/Snyman
375
 test and decided that the caravan was 
permanently used as a store and referred to the question of the degree of permanency of the 
purpose in the utilisation of the structure, and specifically the reasoning in the Jecha
376
 case; 
with particular reference to the statement that “there must be some degree of permanence 
about such purpose for which the structure is used”.
377
 On review, the court rejected the 
distinction suggested by Snyman as unsupported in the case law and derived from the 
somewhat arbitrary and illogical distinctions.
378
 The court saw the extension of the concept of 
the „premises‟ as part of a developmental process in the law of housebreaking which has 
taken place in the courts, primarily in response to the societal factors and the need to combat 
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 The alleged distinction was more apparent than real, and the caution of the court in 
dealing with the „premises‟ used for storage should not be mistaken for the creation of a 
principle.
380
 The court held that in the absence of any “truly consistent, coherent and logical 
principle,” the real distinction is between:  
 
 on the one hand, a structure or quasi-structure in which goods are kept or stored to 
safeguard them from the elements or misappropriation, or placed for functional 
reasons; and  
 on the other hand, structures or quasi-structures in which goods are placed for ease of 
storage or conveyance like packing cases or containers.
381
       
 
The crime can be committed in respect of the first category and not in respect of the second 
category.
382
 The accused does not commit a crime if he “breaks into a suitcase or even a 
modern steel container lying on the wharf-side prior to being loaded onto a vessel for 
conveyance”; however, it could be regarded as falling within the ambit of the crime if it were 
used as a habitation, a storeroom, an office or a shop.
383
 It seems that according to the 
criterion in the Temmers case, the crime can be committed in respect of virtually any 
structure used for human habitation no matter how flimsy its construction.
384
 This criterion 
may be criticised for its vagueness as goods may be placed in a container or a structure both 
in order to “safeguard them from the elements or misappropriation” and “for ease of storage”, 
in which case the structure would fall into both categories.
385
 The phrase “or placed for 
functional reasons” in the formulation seems to be too vague to be workable.
386
 It should be 
noted that whatever criterion one adopts, if the structure is used for storage of goods, it need 
not necessarily be so large that a person of average height can enter it.
387
 The material of 
which the structure is made is of little assistance.
388
 A person who has a right of entry to a 
house or a building may still commit the housebreaking in respect of a separate room in the 
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Given the vagueness of the criterion or lack of it to decide whether a structure qualifies as 
one in respect of which a crime can be committed; it comes as no surprise that the courts 
experience the considerable difficulties in deciding whether a caravan qualifies.
390
 A caravan 
is defined as a “house on wheels”.
391
 Prior to the Temmers
392
 case, it seemed as if the courts 
had decided that a caravan qualified as the „premises‟, even if the „breaking‟ occurred at the 
time when nobody was living in it,
393
 but that it never qualified if it was used merely for the 
purpose of storing goods.
394
 This construction is perfectly explicable in terms of the De 
Wet/Snyman criterion according to which a structure used merely for the storing of goods 




In terms of the Temmers
396
 criterion, a caravan used merely for the storage of goods may 
qualify.
397
 The court held that a caravan used as a shop which was not moved around but was 
positioned in the particular place “with a relative degree of permanency” qualified.
398
 The 
structure in question in Temmers
399
 was for all practical purposes an immovable structure 
hence it would have qualified as the premises in respect of which the crime of housebreaking 




 The crime of housebreaking can be 
committed in respect of an empty caravan that is displayed for sale.
402
 In the most recent case 
of Maswetswa,
403
 the court‟s difficulties had little or nothing to do with the challenges posed 





On the question of whether housebreaking can be committed in respect of a caravan, one 
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must simply follow the common-sense approach which means that the normal purpose of a 
caravan is to serve as a place in which to stay, although the people seldom stay permanently 
in a caravan.
405
 The court in the Mavungu
406
 case held that a breaking and entry into a 
caravan could constitute the crime of housebreaking; that, just as a caravan could be regarded 
as the „premises‟ for the purpose of the housebreaking liability, it could be regarded as the 
„building‟ for the purposes of trespass liability; and that, a „building‟ for the purposes of the 
trespass offence including all habitual „structures‟.
407
 The normal use of a caravan is the 
human habitation and as such qualifies as a structure in respect of which the housebreaking 
can be committed.
408
 It would only be in the exceptional cases, that is, when it has been 
converted into a place for storing goods on a reasonably permanent basis, that it, would not 
qualify as a structure, as where the wheels have been removed and placed on the bricks or 
other blocks to serve as a dovecote.
409
 According to Snyman, a criterion that is more 
workable, less vague, and therefore to be preferred to that suggested in the Temmers
410
 case is 
the one according to which a structure used for the storage of goods or property must be 
immovable in order to qualify.
411
 A trailer that is hooked onto the back of a motor vehicle and 
which is meant only for the transportation of goods ought according to the De Wet
412
 
criterion not to qualify as a structure in respect of which the crime can be committed, because 
it is movable and not intended for human habitation.
413
     
 
4.4 De Wet/Snyman Perspective 
  
De Wet was very critical of the crime of housebreaking; however, conceded the fact of its 
existence, and discussed it in terms of the decided case law, where in relation to the 
„premises‟ requirement he surveyed a number of cases relating to the varying structures.
414
 
On the basis of the cases he noted, he distilled the criterion set out below.
415
 De Wet did not 
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propose this criterion as workable or desirable, but saw the distinction as unjustifiable and 
artificial.
416
 Snyman has been consistently following this distinction throughout all his six 
editions of the Criminal Law.
417
 It has also been cited with approval in the case of Ngobeza
418
 





Snyman is critical of the elements of the crime of housebreaking, among other things, the 
„premises‟ that they are very artificial and can give rise to the differing interpretations.
420
 He 
is referring to the lack of a general principle which can be applied to determine whether a 
particular „structure‟ or „building‟ falls within the ambit of the crime of housebreaking and in 
the absence of such a principle he subscribes to the working distinction developed by De 
Wet.
421
 In the one category of the distinction is the structures used for human habitation 
which may be regarded as the „premises‟ whether movable or immovable, and in the other 









 as being consistent with the De Wet 
distinction and criticised the case of Temmers
425
 for adopting a contrary approach to that of 
the De Wet criterion.
426
 He found no useful guidance in the Mavungu
427
 decision in resolving 
this issue and set out his suggested solution to this matter, consistent with the distinction 
proposed by De Wet.
428
 Snyman states that the reason for the acquittal in Jecha appears to be 
that the court proceeded from the assumptions that since the caravan in this case still had its 
wheels it ought to be regarded as a movable, and that if the caravan (being a movable, since it 
still had wheels) was merely used for storage of goods, it could not found housebreaking 
liability, since a structure used for this purpose is required to be immovable.
429
 These 
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4.5 The Hoctor Perspective  
 
All the criminal law writers agree that the crime of housebreaking applies to all the 
„structures‟ used for human habitation, whether movable or immovable in nature.
431
 The 
practical effect of restricting the ambit of the crime to the immovable „structures‟ would 
invariably deprive those who live in the informal dwellings of the protection of the crime and 




 The scholars 
differ when it comes to the issue of the „structures‟ used for storage. There are a number of 
cases where our courts have focused on the use or purpose of the „structure‟ to determine 




The court in Thompson
435
 held that “the question is not determined by the nature of the house 
but by the use to which it is put”.
436
 The court defined the test as “the permanency of the 
occupation, the use to which the structure broken into is put” and on this basis confirmed the 
housebreaking conviction in respect of a tent used as a dwelling.
437
 This test was also applied 




 The court in Lawrence,
440
 cited the Gardiner and 
Lansdown
441




 cases where it based its 
conviction on the ordinary use of the ship‟s cabin.
444
 The court in Coetzee
445
 also held that 
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 the court cited with approval 

















 with approval and then concluded that a 
caravan should be regarded as a dwelling in respect of the crime of housebreaking and that 
even for the „structures‟ not used for human habitation it does not matter whether the 




Snyman argues that a caravan can be used for the purpose of storing goods and that in such a 
case it ought not to be regarded as the premises, particularly if it still has its wheels.
461
 He 
argues further that the position would be different if the caravan has been changed into an 
immovable structure through the removal of its wheels.
462
 It is certainly questionable whether 
a caravan becomes an immovable when its wheels are removed.
463
 
The approach adopted by Hunt reconciles more truly with the case law than does the De 
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 The test employed by Hunt
465
 is correct in all respects if the 
nature of the „structure‟ is regarded to be a function of its purpose, which is ultimately 
determinative of whether one is dealing with the premises which properly fall within the 
protection of the crime of housebreaking.
466
 The proposed test in Temmers is worthy of 
support in its adoption of the purposive approach.
467
   
    
The best approach to be applied by our courts is the one of pragmatic common sense.
468
 The 
factor which ought to weigh most heavily with the court is the intention of the user or 
occupier and that, provided the structure fits the usual common-sense test applied by the 
court, simple testimony as to the intended use will suffice to bring the structure within the 
ambit of the crime.
469
 The application of this approach should counteract Snyman‟s concerns 
regarding the “vagueness” of the Temmers criterion.
470
 Motor vehicles may qualify for the 
protection of the crime of housebreaking in appropriate circumstances.
471
 The most important 
consideration is the intended use of the structure.
472
 The structure is required to be used for 
either human habitation or storage purposes in our law and as such, the intent of the owner, 
occupier, or user should be definitive in this regard.
473
 The common-sense approach is, 
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The overarching purpose for this dissertation is to demonstrate that the crime of 
housebreaking is best placed as a common-law crime in South African law. For this to be 
achieved, the elements that cause most difficulties in the definition of this crime had to be 
examined, namely, the „breaking‟ and the „premises‟ elements.  
 
Chapter one of this dissertation is an introductory chapter that briefly discusses the historical 
background of this crime which comprised its sources, namely, the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law as well as the English law. It also discusses the various aspects germane to this 
dissertation, namely, early development of this crime, the rationale for the study of this 
dissertation, the statement of purpose of this study, the research questions pertaining to this 
study, the methodology employed for this study as well as outline of this dissertation 
structure.  
 
Chapter two discusses the nature of the crime of housebreaking from South African law 
perspective. The aspects pertaining to the nature of this crime being discussed are as follows: 
general definition, purpose, all the elements apart from two, namely, „breaking‟ and 
„premises‟ elements as well as proposed reformation.  
 
Chapter three is dedicated to one element of this crime, namely, the „breaking‟ element. The 
various aspects germane to this element are discussed, namely, the current South African law 
position, the sources of controversy and the significance of „breaking‟ requirement. The 
South African law position aspect unpacks what is entailed by the „breaking‟ concept by 
defining it and discussing its nature. The sources of controversy involve the English 
common-law exceptions to the no displacement, no breaking rule; exclusion of the „breaking 
out‟ cases from the housebreaking ambit and a right to „break‟. Both exceptions are discussed 
at length.  
 
Chapter four is dedicated to the second element that is also subject to criticism, namely, the 
„premises‟ element. The original meaning of the term „premises‟ is discussed; as well as the 
purpose thereof. Other common-law jurisdictions are discussed relating to their interpretation 
46 
 
of this element and their views. The current South African law position is discussed as well 
as the De Wet/Snyman and Hoctor perspectives. 
 
This chapter concludes the dissertation. It covers the response to the purpose and aims of this 
dissertation and answers the research questions as stated in the first chapter.      
 
5.1 Concluding Remarks                     
 
Abolition of this crime is not an option, as discussed in chapter two, as this would necessarily 
leave a vacuum in the substantive criminal law which cannot possibly be filled by some new 
measures. It is correct that, merely falling back on the offence of trespassing coupled with 
possible conviction of malicious injury to property would definitely not satisfy the undoubted 
need to treat housebreaking separately from any other criminal conduct as discussed in 
chapter two. The existence of the crime of housebreaking is a necessity and all the scholars 
agree on this aspect. The law relating to the common-law crime of housebreaking has been 
developing all the time. This development has been taking place concomitantly with the 
societal needs, so that the crime remains relevant for the purpose it purports to serve. It 
should be noted that this crime followed its own developmental path; even though the English 
law offences of burglary and housebreaking closely approximated the equivalent offence in 
South African law and contributed to its development by way of authorities as discussed in 
chapter two. Thus our courts began to develop this crime from the stage it was inherited from 
English law into our law; and for this, our courts should be commended.       
 
The basis for criticisms of this crime has been the fragmentary and technical nature of its 
elements and lack of overarching rationale for the crime as discussed in the first chapter. The 
lack of overarching rationale is the thing of the past since Hoctor has given the most 
appropriate rationale for this crime as “the protection of the owner or occupant against the 
psychological trauma and sense of violation invariably accompanying a housebreaking” as 
discussed in chapter two. The elements of the crime have been fragmentary and technical in 
nature even when the crime was inherited from English law. Our courts have been behind the 
development every time the need arises as it was the case in the case of Johannes where the 
court brought about the new perspective on the issue of defining the boundaries of the 
premises concept as discussed in chapter four. Thus despite the fragmentary and technical 
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nature of the elements, our courts have been applying the same elements without fail. There 
was a stage when the crime had to be committed in the night time with intent to commit a 
felony inside the mansion as discussed in the first chapter. The courts, as part of the 
developmental process at that time, justifiably got rid of these unnecessary requirements.  
 
When the societal need arose that the premises requirement be broadened to include the 
storage place in the premises requirement as opposed to confine this requirement to the 
human habitation in the form of a mansion; the courts duly broadened this element to include 
storage place. In fact, the recent development of the common law in respect of this crime 
pragmatically took place just before the 1996 Constitution was promulgated through the 
decision of the court in Temmers as discussed in chapter four. The court came up with a new 
perspective on the problems inherent in defining the boundaries of the concept of the 
„premises‟ as part of the developmental process aimed at developing this crime. The court 
saw the extension of the notion of the „premises‟ as part of a developmental process in the 
law of housebreaking which has taken place in the courts, primarily in response to societal 
factors and the need to combat the crime as discussed in chapter four. The court must be 
commended for developing the common law in respect of the crime of housebreaking in the 
way it did in the Temmers case.  
 
The purpose of this crime is not so much to protect the dwelling as a building but to protect 
its security that represented the indefinable idea, existent at all times that the home was 
inviolable: every individual exercised his greatest freedom at home as discussed in chapter 
two. The purpose of the crime is therefore to preserve the sanctity of the home or habitation 
against intrusions that involve danger or harm to the inhabitants as also discussed in chapter 
two. One cannot possibly think of any other crime or offence that can best serve this purpose 
other than the crime of housebreaking. It follows then, that the crime of malicious injury to 
property and the trespassory offence cannot serve the same purpose that is served by the 
crime of housebreaking. The trespassory offence is unsuited to the housebreaking role, as it 
does not include any requirement that the intruders have any intent to commit a further 
offence upon entry and is not punishing a preparatory offence but instead the harm being 
punished is simply an unlawful entry as discussed in chapter two. Thus the crime of 
housebreaking is irreplaceable. 
 





 Our courts have a constitutional duty to develop this common-law crime where, 
from a constitutional perspective, development is necessary. The adoption of the 1996 
Constitution was a solution to the difficulties and problems relating to this crime remaining a 
common law. Our courts have a constitutional duty to develop this common-law crime if 
necessary. Because there is no need for the intervention of the legislature insofar as the crime 
of housebreaking is concerned, it should remain a common-law crime in South African law. 
No major difficulties or problems have been experienced by our courts in respect of the crime 
of housebreaking after Snyman‟s proposals for reforming the law of housebreaking.
475
 All 
that is required to be done by our courts is to develop the common-law crime of 
housebreaking in line with the provisions of section 173 of the 1996 Constitution, and to 
ensure that the rules relating to this crime are consistently applied.  
 
The South African common-law crime of housebreaking is purely a development by the 
South African courts from the early English with some of the eccentric corners knocked off 
as discussed in chapter two. This means that the development of this crime is not a new thing 
since it has been developing from the very early stage when it became part of our law. The 
courts should be mindful of the fact that the crime is being developed whenever the courts 
apply the rules relating to this crime. The 1996 Constitution has put weight behind this 
development for the courts to be constitutionally bound to develop this common-law crime 
where, from a constitutional perspective, development is necessary.    
 
In respect of the actual breaking, that is, physical and literal breaking, all scholars do not 
have any qualms with this first category of breaking as discussed in chapter three. The only 
difficulty is in respect of the second category where there has been no displacement or little 
displacement, that is, the absence of actual breaking. It may be concluded that whatever 
solution that might be proposed in respect of the latter category, it should not affect the 
former category since there is no difficulty or problem in respect of it. The position relating 
to the first category should not change; all forms of actual breaking should continue to attract 
housebreaking liability. With regard to the latter category, it may be concluded that the 
correct approach is the one proposed by Hoctor, namely, that the concept of breaking 
currently employed by our courts should be extended to include any ingress by unusual 
                                                          
474 Section 173 of the 1996 Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts 
have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice.     
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means, that is, in any way but through an open door as discussed in chapter three. The 
adoption of this perspective by our courts would be an important step heading towards the 
development of this common-law crime in compliance with the constitutional obligation as 
required by the provisions of section 173 of the 1996 Constitution.   
 
With this approach all irregular ingresses into the building with the intent to commit a crime 
within the premises would necessarily amount to „breaking‟, thereby having satisfied the 
„breaking‟ requirement as contained in the definition of the crime of housebreaking; thus 
extending protection of private property rights to all whose dwelling or storage space has 
been invaded. The accused in Ngobeza would have been found guilty of the crime of 
housebreaking had the court adopted this approach since the accused got into the building 
through the roof and not by creeping through the fence surrounding the premises. It may be 
concluded that this approach is necessary to cover all the situations where there may be no 
displacement at all; but the ingress has been obtained through an opening or aperture that the 
owner or occupant of the premises had never intended to use as a point of human entry. The 
question of little displacement or no displacement as discussed in chapter three shall only be 
important when it comes to entry through the door or any other aperture or opening which is 
used as a point of human entry into the premises. The manner of ingress is so important that 
the nefarious intent of the accused can be established by the manner in which he has entered; 
otherwise it may be difficult to establish the intent to commit a crime. A situation like the one 
that arose in Mososa can never arise again with the application of this approach or 
development. 
 
According to this approach, the situations as discussed in chapter three are covered, namely, 
ingress through a window, irrespective of whether it was closed or open, a skylight, a 
chimney, a roof, a space between the window and the door, a space between the roof top and 
the wall, or any other aperture or opening not designed for human ingress. In Chalala, the 
accused would have been found guilty of the crime of housebreaking with this proposed 
development.  
 
The position relating to ingress through the door should remain as it is. There have been no 
difficulties or problems relating to ingress through the door. In our law it has always been 
„breaking‟ where the accused has unlocked and open, then entered through the door or 
opened a closed door or left ajar door. There is no development that needs to be effected in 
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respect of this position. Thus the decision of the court in Moroe
476
 was correct. All forms of 
the doctrine of constructive breaking should form part of our law as part of the development 
of the common-law crime of housebreaking. These are most unpleasant forms of the criminal 
activities since they involve a high degree of dishonesty, for instance, where the accused 
makes the complainant believe that he is a municipal official coming to work on the 
instructions of local municipality yet he is a criminal dressed in municipal uniform coming to 
commit nefarious activities. In this situation, when the complainant allows ingress, he does so 
innocently. The consent given by the complainant has to be vitiated once it comes to light 
that in fact it was given as a result of the misrepresentation and the act of the accused is 
tantamount to that of a housebreaker hence such conduct should suffice for the „breaking‟.  
Thus Hoctor‟s views as discussed in chapter three should be supported insofar as the adoption 
of the doctrine of constructive breaking into our law is concerned.     
 
The development in respect of the „premises‟ requirement occurred from the time this crime 
was inherited from English law as discussed in chapter four. The original term that was used 
to describe this requirement was a “mansion house” as discussed in the first chapter. This 
term has fallen into complete disuse through the development of this common-law crime and 
the changing of societal circumstances in all common-law jurisdictions. It is as a result of this 
development that there is no crime of „hamesucken‟ anymore. For that reason, the approaches 
adopted by the courts in Johannes and Temmers advocated by Hoctor is to be preferred to the 
one adopted by De Wet and supported by Snyman as discussed in chapter four. Our courts 
have generally adopted the common-sense approach first expressed by Gardiner J, in 
Johannes, and enunciated by Gardiner and Lansdown as discussed in chapter four. The 
common-sense approach entails that the normal purpose of the structure is determinative in 
terms of housebreaking criminal liability. For instance, the normal purpose of a caravan is to 
serve as a place in which to stay, though it is seldom used for that purpose, and for that 
reason it is a structure for human habitation and thus regarded as „premises‟ for the purposes 
of housebreaking liability. The application of this approach will ensure consistency by our 
courts when dealing with housebreaking cases.    
 
For one to clearly understand the significance of „breaking‟, one has to painstakingly consider 
the following two scenarios: a case where a man removes the roof tiles and cuts the ceiling 
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board, then enters the premises through the hole he created himself and steals some items 
from inside; and a case where a man simply walks in through the door which had been left 
wide open and steals from inside. There is no way one can safely say that the scope and the 
nature of these two completely distinct criminal activities can be same. If the „breaking‟ 
element were to be removed, and not form part of the definition of this crime anymore, then 
these two completely different scenarios would be treated as one and the same thing, 
constituting the crime of unlawful entry with intent to steal. The South African law cannot 
afford to have the distinction blurred, and thus the „breaking‟ element and all other elements, 
currently constituting this crime, for that matter should be retained as they are in the 
definition of the crime of housebreaking. The crime of housebreaking should be retained in 






A table of cases   
 
Asbury v Rex 1946 NPD 55. 
Burns v Allen 1987 SCCR 449. 
Eldridge (1944) 81 CCC 388 (BCCA). 
Heyns v Regina 1956 (2) PH H247 (C).    
Knotts v State (Tex Crim App 1895) 32 SW Rep 532. 
R v Abrahams 1953 (1) PH H50 (N). 
R v Andries 1958 (2) SA 669 (E). 
R v Attia 1937 TPD 102. 
R v Botha 1960 (2) SA 147 (T). 
R v Brice (1821) Russ & Ry 450. 
R v Chalala 1947 (3) SA 62 (O). 
R v Chandler [1913] 1 KB 125. 
R v Charlie 1916 TPD 367. 
R v Coetzee 1958 (2) SA 8 (T). 
R v Crawford 1924 PH H5 (GW). 
R v Dorfling 1954 (2) SA 125 (E). 
R v Faison 1952 (2) SA 671 (SR). 
R v Fourie/Louw 1907 ORC 58. 
R v George 1921 EDL 125. 
R v Gomaseb 1936 SWA 16. 
R v Johannes 1918 CPD 488. 
R v Johnson 1841 C & M 218. 
R v Lawrence 1954 (2) SA 408 (C).      
R v Lewis 1929 CPD 43. 
R v M‟Tech 1912 TPD 1132. 
R v Makoelman 1932 EDL 194. 
R v Mamewecke 1939 (2) PH H178 (SR). 
R v Mososa 1931 CPD 348. 
R v Moyana 1921 EDL 139. 
R v Ngema 1960 (1) SA 517 (T). 
53 
 
R v Ovamboland 1931 SWA 11. 
R v Shela & Others 1950 (2) PH H193 (W). 
R v Shelembe 1955 (4) SA 410 (N). 
R v Shimbakua 1955 (1) SA 331 (SWA). 
R v Smith 1959 (4) SA 524 (N). 
R v Spriggs & Hancock (1834) 1 Mood & R 357. 
R v Steyn 1946 OPD 426. 
R v Thompson 1905 ORC 127. 
R v Thuis 1926 EDL 89. 
R v Tusi 1957 (4) SA 553 (N). 
R v van Boven 1917 CPD 204.  
R v Xabela 1945 PH H282 (T). 
S v Abrahams 1998 2 SACR 655 (C). 
S v Cupido 1975 (1) SA 537 (C).  
S v Dyantyi 1973 PH H40 (T). 
S v Hlongwane 1992 (2) SACR 484 (N). 
S v Jecha 1984 (1) SA 209 (ZHC). 
S v Lekute 1991 2 SACR 221 (C). 
S v Madini [2000] 4 All SA (NC) 20. 
S v Madyo 1990 (1) SACR 292 (E). 
S v Maelangwe 1999 1 SACR 133 (NC). 
S v Maisa 1968 (1) SA 271 (T). 
S v Maswetswa 2014 1 SACR 288 (GSJ). 
S v Maunatlala 1982 (1) SA 877 (T). 
S v Mavungu 2009 1 SACR 425 (T). 
S v Meyeza 1962 (3) SA 386 (N). 
S v Moroe 1981 (4) SA 897 (O). 
S v Ndhlovu 1963 (1) SA 926 (T). 
S v Ngobeza 1992 1 SACR 610 (T). 
S v Rudman 1989 (3) SA 368 (E). 
S v Temmers 1994 (1) SACR 357 (C). 
S v Tshuke 1965 (1) SA 582 (T). 
S v Woodrow 1999 2 SACR 109 (C). 
54 
 
A table of statutes   
 
Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c. C-46 
 S 348 
 
The 1996 Constitution 
 S 173   
 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 S 95 (12) 
 S 262 
 
Theft Act of 1968 
 S 9 (1) (a) 
 
Trespass Act 6 of 1959 




















Books and Chapters in books 
 
Burchell J M & Milton J Principles of Criminal Law Cape Town: Juta, (1991). 
 
Burchell J M Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005).  
 
Burchell J M Principles of Criminal Law 4ed Claremont: Juta, (2013). 
 
Columbia Law Review (1951) 1014. 
 
De Wet J C Strafreg 4ed (1985). 
 
Gardner & Lansdown South African Law and Procedure Vol. II: Specific Offences 6ed Cape 
Town: Juta, (1957). 
 
Gardiner & Lansdown South African Criminal Law 3ed Cape Town: Juta, (1957). 
 
Hoctor S V Constructive Breaking - A Constructive Part of the Housebreaking Crime? Obiter 
(2005): 726-733. 
 
Hoctor S V The „Breaking‟ requirement in the crime of housebreaking with intent 19 2 Obiter 
(1998): 201-229. 
 
Hoctor S V The crime of housebreaking: in South African Law - A comparative approach 
(1997) D Juris Thesis Leyden University. 
 
Hoctor S V The crime of housebreaking: To reform or to reformulate? Obiter (2003): 163-
180.    
 
Hoctor S V The historical antecedents of the housebreaking crime 5 Fundamina (1999). 
 
Hoctor S V The premises requirement in the housebreaking Obiter (1998): 127-133. 
 




Hunt P M A South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II: Common-Law Crimes 1
st
 ed 
Cape Town: Juta, (1970). 
 
Hunt P M A South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II: Common-Law Crimes 2ed 
Cape Town: Juta, (1990). 
 
Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper 48: Criminal Intrusions (1986).  
 
Milton J R L South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II: Common-Law Crimes 3ed 
Cape Town: Juta, (1996). 
 
Snyman C R Criminal Law 2ed (1989). 
 
Snyman C R Criminal Law 5ed (2008). 
 
Snyman C R Criminal Law 6ed Durban: Juta, (2014). 
 
Snyman C R Criminal Law Reforming the law relating to housebreaking 6 SACJ (1993): 38-
49. 
 
Visser & Vorster General Principles of Criminal Law Through the cases 3ed Durban; 
Woburn, MA: Butterworth, (1990). 
 
Watney M Unnecessary confusion in respect of housebreaking 3 TSAR (2014): 606-615. 
   











      
